William & Mary Law Review
Volume 19 (1977-1978)
Issue 3

Article 8

March 1978

NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association: The Propriety
of Conditional Certification as a Means of Avoiding Employer
Domination in the Collective Bargaining Unit

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Repository Citation
NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association: The Propriety of Conditional Certification
as a Means of Avoiding Employer Domination in the Collective Bargaining Unit, 19 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 606 (1978), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol19/iss3/8
Copyright c 1978 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship
Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr

NLRB v. ANNAPOLIS EMERGENCY HOSPITAL
ASSOCIATION: THE PROPRIETY OF CONDITIONAL
CERTIFICATION AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING EMPLOYER
DOMINATION IN THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNIT.
In NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital Association,1 the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit overruled the National
Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) certification of the Maryland
Nurses Association, Inc. (MNA) as the exclusive bargaining representative for the registered nurses employed at the Anne Arundel
General Hospital. The Board had conditioned its certification of the
state association on the latter's delegation of its collective bargaining powers to the local Anne Arundel Chapter. Delegation was intended to protect the employee organization conducting the collective bargaining negotiations from any improper employer control
that presumably could have been exercised by the nurses' supervisors, who, as members of the MNA, occupied a number of powerful
positions within that organization. Although the Anne Arundel
Chapter membership included no supervisors, the specter of employer control was raised by the employer-hospital, which had refused to bargain collectively with the local chapter.
In overruling the NLRB's certification, the court rejected longestablished Board policies developed to resolve the problem of employer influence through supervisor membership in labor organizations. This Comment will discuss the evolution of those policies as
well as the manner in which they were applied in Annapolis Emergency Hospital. The analysis will focus on the Fourth Circuit's
treatment of the case in relation to the Board's objectives and
within the context of the legislative intent of the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).2
1. 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977) (en banc). The case originally was decided by a threejudge panel voting two to one in favor of enforcing the Board's order to the employer-hospital
to bargain with the certified nurses' labor organization. The late Judge Craven prepared the
majority opinion in which Judge Hall concurred. Judge Winter wrote a dissenting opinion.

These opinions were reprinted as an appendix to the Fourth Circuit's en banc opinion. See
id. at 528-39. On rehearing, the court voted five to one to deny enforcement, and it adopted

Judge Winter's earlier dissent as the majority opinion [hereinafter cited as Majority Opinion]. Judge Hall adopted Judge Craven's original majority opinion as his dissent [hereinafter

cited as Dissenting Opinion]. Id. at 526.
2. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-168 (1973 & Supp. 1977), as amended by Act of July 26, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395.
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DEVELOPMENT OF BOARD

607

PoLIcY

Soon after its creation in 1935 the NLRB determined that a labor
organization controlled by an employer could not serve as the employees' collective bargaining representative. 3 In accordance with
this principle, employer-dominated organizations were denied certification as exclusive bargaining agents.' The Board subsequently
extended this rule when it recognized that the presence of the employer's supervisors in a labor organization is a manifestation of
employer control.5 Because these supervisors potentially were subject to employer influence,' their inclusion in a bargaining unit
could render it incapable of negotiating at arm's length with the
employer. In 1944 the NLRB applied this principle in Rochester &
PittsburgCoal Co.,8 finding that an entity attempting to represent
the technical and clerical employees of a mining company was subject to employer control because its membership included the
workers' supervisors." The Board noted specifically that supervisors
3. See Phelps Dodge Corp., 6 N.L.R.B. 624 (1938), in which four craft unions of Phelps
Dodge sought certification as the collective bargaining representatives of the corporation's
respective craft employees. Although the Board ultimately defined the craft units so that they
constituted approriate bargaining units, it considered inappropriate the inclusion of Employees Committees, which were controlled by the employer, within the craft unions:
It is obvious from. . . the Articles that the Employees Committees cannot
be considered as bona fide representatives of the employees for purposes of
collective bargaining. This conclusion is compelled . . . by the entire scheme
of the Articles, and especially by the provisions empowering the Company to
terminate the plan at any time. Under the Act we cannot certify an organization
as representative of employees for purposes of collective bargaining, when the
Articles governing its existence and operation on their face evidence the
complete subjection of the organizationto the employer. Such an organization
is patently incapable of bargaining at arm's length with the employer.
Id. at 630 (emphasis supplied).
4. Id.; see, e.g., Buckeye Village Mktg., Inc., 175 N.L.R.B. 271 (1969); Baltimore Transit
Co., 59 N.L.R.B. 159 (1944); Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1760 (1944);
Toledo Stamping & Mfg. Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 865 (1944); Douglas Aircraft Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 486
(1943).
5. Rochester & Pittsburg Coal Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1760, 1763 (1944); see, e.g., Alaska Salmon
Indus., Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 185 (1948) (solicitation of union membership cards by supervisors
of employer disqualified organization); Toledo Stamping & Mfg. Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 865 (1944)
(certification denied to organization because employer's supervisor obtained employee application cards); Douglas Aircraft Co., 53 N.L.R.B. 486 (1943) (certification denied to unit
organized by employer's supervisor).
6. See, e.g., Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal Co., 56 N.L.R.B. 1760, 1763-64 (1944).
7. Id. at 1764.
8. 56 N.L.R.B. 1760 (1944).
9. Id. at 1763.
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not only outnumbered the employee organization members but also
actively participated in the organization's management."0
The Board regarded these two factors as controlling in Columbia
Pictures Corp.," a 1951 decision in which it refused to certify an
organization seeking to represent all employees, including supervisors, in motion picture studio art departments.'2 Noting that the
entity was "predominately composed of supervisors and that these
supervisors have materially participated in the organization of the
employees,"' 3 the Board concluded that it was supervisor-, and
therefore employer-, dominated."4 As in Rochester & Pittsburg
Coal,' 5 the supervisors in Columbia Pictures whose membership
caused disqualification were employed by the particular employer
with whom the organization would bargain.'"
The mere presence of supervisors in the membership of a labor
organization has not been sufficient to establish employer domination of that entity.'7 Rather, as suggested by the two factors developed in Rochester & Pittsburgh Coal and Columbia Pictures, the
Board has focused on whether the supervisors actually control the
organization.' 8 In the 1968 decision of InternationalPaper Co.,'" for
10. Id.
11. 94 N.L.R.B. 466 (1951).
12. Id. at 467.
13. Id. at 470.
14. Id.
15. 56 N.L.R.B. at 1761.
16. 94 N.L.R.B. at 466-67. See generally Oak Ridge Hosp., 220 N.L.R.B. 49 (1975) (organization not disqualified when three of 13 directors were supervisors because none working for
employer); Carle Clinic Ass'n, 192 N.L.R.B. 512 (1971) (supervisors on board of directors did
not disqualify organization because none employed by employer); New York City Omnibus
Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 579 (1953) (Board's reference to supervisors meant those hired by employer).
17. See, e.g., NLRB v. Edward G. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1948) (employees
must participate in labor organization but it need not be composed exclusively of employees);
International Paper Co., 172 N.L.R.B. 933 (1968) (certified state nurses' organization included supervisors in its membership); International Organization of Masters, Mates & Pilots, Inc., 144 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1963) (entity in which employees participate constitutes labor
organization despite membership of many supervisors).
18. See, e.g., Brunswick Pulp & Paper Co., 152 N.L.R.B. 973, 975 (1965) (local union
disqualified because bylaws provided that only supervisors or "producers" who are independent contractors could be officers); New York City Omnibus Corp., 104 N.L.R.B. 579, 584
(1953) (union president and 93 of 113 members were supervisors employed by employer);
Columbia Pictures Corp., 94 N.L.R.B. 466, 470 (1951) (supervisors of the employer with whom
organization was to bargain materially participated in and were the predominant members
of the labor unit).
19. 172 N.L.R.B. 933 (1968).
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example, the NLRB certified a state nurses' association, which included supervisors in its membership, as the bargaining agent for
nurses employed by an industrial plant. The basis for the certification was the employees' substantial participation in the association's affairs."0 Furthermore, none of the employer's supervisors occupied positions of authority within the association, thereby negating that employer's ability to control the labor organization by influencing its supervisors. Finally, the Board accepted the association's
statement that all collective bargaining matters would be handled
by the local chapter, in which no supervisors held membership. 2 '
When coverage of the NLRA was extended to health care institutions in 1974,22 the Board followed the principles outlined in
International Paper for certifying professional associations as
nurses' collective bargaining agents. Because the state associations
have included supervisor nurses in their membership, the NLRB
has been forced to contend with the possibility of supervisor domination in these organizations. Three recent cases, St. Rose de Lima
2
Hospital,21 Sisters of Charity of Providence,'
and Sierra Vista Hospital, Inc.,21 illustrate the Board's treatment of this situation.
In the three decisions, the NLRB certified state affiliates of the
American Nurses Association (ANA),'2 all of which admittedsupervisors as members, as collective bargaining agents for nurses at local
hospitals. The Board found no danger that these local hospitals
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Labor-Management Relations Amendments of 1974, Pub, L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(amending 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970)). As a result of this legislation, labor-management
disputes involving for-profit as well as nonprofit health facilities became subject to the full
body of statutory and decisional labor law. The term "health care institution" as defined by
the amendments includes "any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the
care of sick, infirm, or aged persons." 29 U.S.C.A. § 152(14) (Supp. 1977).
For an exposition of the legislative history and extended coverage of the Health Care

Amendments, see Carroll, Health CareInstitution Coverage Under the NationalLaborRelations Act, 38 Tax. B.J. 257 (1975); Feheley, Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act: Health Care Institutions, 36 Omo ST. L.J. 235 (1975); Pointer, Toward a National

Hospital LaborRelations Policy: An Examinationof Legislative Exemption, 23 LAB. L.J. 238
(1972); Vernon, Labor Relations in the Health Care Field Under the 1974 Amendments to
the National Labor Relations Act: An Overview and Analysis, 70 Nw. U. L. Ray. 202 (1975).
23. 223 N.L.R.B. 1511, 92 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1976).
24. 225 N.L.R.B. 799, 93 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1976).

25. 225 N.L.R.B. 1086, 93 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1976).
26. The Maryland Nurses Association, the organization involved in Annapolis Emergency
Hospital, is also an affiliate of the ANA.
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could influence the associations through their supervisors, because
none of their supervisors occupied positions of managerial control
within the organizations. 21 Of. greater significance, as in
InternationalPaper, the associations had delegated control over
collective bargaining to local chapters that excluded supervisors
from membership,2s thereby further insulating the collective bargaining process from potential employer control. In Sisters of
Charity and Sierra Vista this delegation was the central issue.2 9 In
both cases, the Board considered a motion to revoke certification on
the grounds that the state association had failed to delegate control
of collective bargaining to the local chapter. In denying these motions,3" the NLRB indicated that its prior certification was conditioned on the existence of this delegation.31
NLRB policies for dealing with employer control over labor organizations through membership of supervisors, therefore, have focused
on the particular employer's capability to assert authority. Clearly,
the mere presence of supervisors among its members has not disqualified an organization, and if a particular employer's supervisors
have been in no positions of control, the Board has granted certification. To protect employees further, the NLRB has developed the
practice of requiring parent organizations that include supervisor
members to delegate collective bargaining authority to local chap27. Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225.N.L.R.B. at 1086, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1172; Sisters of Charity
of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. at 799 n.6, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1156 n.6; St. Rose de Lima Hosp.,
Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. at 1512, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1182.
28. Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. at 1087-88, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1173-74; Sisters of
Charity of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. at 800, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1156; St. Rose de Lima Hosp.,
Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. at 1512, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1183.
29. Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. at 1086, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1172; Sisters of Charity
of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. at 799, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1155. In St. Rose, as in International
Paper, the Board merely found that because control over collective bargaining had been
delegated to bodies excluding supervisors from membership, the labor organization was not
dominated by the employer's supervisors. 223 N.L.R.B. at 1512, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1183.
30. Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. at 1088, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1174; Sisters of Charity
of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. at 801, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1157. In denying these motions, the Board
found proper delegation despite contentions that the state associations were required to
execute all agreements and that the associations had been involved in the collective bargaining process. Addressing the first objection, the NLRB determined that the state associations'
approval was only a formality after an agreement had been accepted by the local chapter.
As to the second contention, the Board found the associations' participation to be merely
advisory. See Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. at 1087, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1173; Sisters of
Charity of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. at 800-01, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1156-57.
31. Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. at 1086, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1172; Sisters of Charity
of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. at 799, 93 L.R.R.M. at 1155; see Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at
534-35.
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ters that exclude supervisors. This was the context of decisional law
and policy in which NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hospital
Association3 2 was decided.
NLRB v. ANNAPOLiS EMERGENCY HOSPITAL ASSOCIAToN
The Maryland Nurses Association, Inc. (MNA) filed an election
petition with the NLRB, requesting certification as the collective
bargaining representative of the registered nurses employed by the
Anne Arundel Hospital.s A state affiliate of the American Nurses
Association (ANA), the MNA extended its membership to include
all registered nurses, regardless of their status as supervisors. As a
result, approximately one-third of the MNA's members were supervisors within the meaning of the Act."
Ten supervisors were on the MNA board of directors; no
supervisor-directors, however, were employed by Anne Arundel
General Hospital. 5 Moreover, although local chapters were formed
at the employer level as vehicles for implementing MNA policies,
the MNA claimed that its bylaws delegated all collective bargaining
authority to the local chapters." Finally, because the Anne Arundel
Chapter excluded supervisors from its membership, 3 it mandated
that all collective bargaining with the Anne Arundel General Hospital be conducted and controlled by non-supervisor employees.
Finding MNA to be a labor organization within the meaning of
the Act,* the NLRB ordered that an election be held and that the
32. 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977).
33. Id. at 526. For an explanation of the procedures for Board certification of a collective
bargaining representative, see note 39 infra.
34. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 534; see 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970), which provides:
The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest
of the employer to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or
to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine
or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.
35. Dissenting Opinion, 561 F.2d at 529. In addition, no supervisor of the hospital-employer
currently was serving as an MNA officer. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 534.
36. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 538.
37. Dissenting Opinion, 561 F.2d at 529.
38. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 217 N.L.R.B. 848, 849, 89 L.R.R.M. 1173, 1174
(1975); see 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) (1970), which provides:
The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any

agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of
employment or conditions of work.
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MNA be placed on the ballot. 9 The MNA won the election and was
certified as the bargaining representative, but the Anne Arundel
General Hospital refused to negotiate with the local unit. In response to this failure to bargain, the MNA filed an unfair labor
practice charge. 0
In considering the charge, the Board rejected the hospital's argument that supervisor membership rendered the MNA an inappropriate labor organization. Because none of the hospital's supervisors
were in management positions within the MNA and because the
MNA had delegated all control over collective bargaining to a local
chapter containing no supervisors in its membership, the inclusion
of supervisors within the
organization did not subject the MNA to
41
the hospital's control.
After the hospital again refused to negotiate, the NLRB petitioned the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit for enforcement
of its order to bargain. Holding that the MNA was not a labor
organization within the meaning of the Act, the court overturned
the Board's decision and refused enforcement.42 Inasmuch as the
Board required the MNA to delegate its bargaining authority, the
court reasoned, the association impliedly was not a bona fide labor
organization 3 Moreover, the court inferred that the Board recognized the inherent threat in certifying a labor unit containing a large
number of the employer's supervisors as members.44 Consequently,
39. The procedures for NLRB certification of a collective bargaining representative generally are invoked through the filing of a petition by a labor organization attempting either to
become the representative for a group of unrepresented employees or to supplant the existing
representative. If the Board determines that a "question of representation" exists, it orders
an election by secret ballot. The organization receiving a majority of the votes becomes the
collective bargaining representative, upon its certification by the Board. For further detail
on the procedures for determining representation, see 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970). To be placed
on the ballot and ultimately to gain certification, an entity must be a bona fide labor organization. For the statutory definition of "labor organization", see note 38 supra.
40. 561 F.2d at 527. The MNA's charge alleged violations of §§ 158(a)(1) and 158(a)(5) of
the NLRA. Under § 158(a)(1) "[iut [is] an unfair labor practice for an employer . . . to
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section
157 of this title." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970). Section 157 provides that "[e]mployees shall
have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
"
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection ....
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970). Section 158(a)(5) makes "[i]t . . . an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees
..." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).

41.
42.
43.
44.

217 N.L.R.B. at 849, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1174.
561 F.2d at 526. For the statutory definition of "labor organization", see note 38 supra.
Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 535.
Id.
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the Fourth Circuit determined that the NLRB's issuance of a conditional certification to an organization subject to supervisor domination was illegal as a matter of law. 5
CoNFLIcT BETWEEN

NLRB AND FoURTH CIRcurr

In Annapolis Emergency Hospitalthe Fourth Circuit rejected two
important concepts developed by the NLRB in its attempts to resolve the problems associated with the certification of labor organizations containing supervisor members. First, the decision ignored
the Board's policy of focusing on the control a particular employer
could exercise through the domination of his supervisors, and, instead, expanded this concept to create a general disqualification of
organizations in which any supervisor maintains some degree of
power. Second, the court held illegal the NLRB's developing practice of extending conditional certification as a means of mitigating
possible supervisor influence." The court's rejection of these Board
policies, although apparently designed to protect employees, actually legitimized the employer-hospital's refusal to bargain with its
employees. Whether this repudiation can be justified in the context
of the policies and the legislative intent of the NLRA is questionable.
Employer Control
In Annapolis Emergency Hospital the Fourth Circuit reasoned
that, although the supervisors were employed by hospitals other
than Anne Arundel General, their presence within the MNA hierarchy raised a: conflict of interest problem sufficient to disqualify
the association as a bona fide labor organization." Presumably, the
court adopted and expanded the Board's rule excluding labor organizations subject to supervisor control; nevertheless, the NLRB's policy had focused on the dangers inherent in allowing supervisors of
the particular employer with whom the organization would bargain
to participate in its management.48 The court, on the other hand,
applied this rule to supervisors working for other employers and
45. Id. at 536-37.
46. 561 F.2d at 528.
47. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 535-36. Although the opinion does not articulate a
conflict of interest standard, such a criterion can be inferred from the court's apparent
conclusion that a labor organization could not include any supervisors as members. Id.
48. See notes 15-21 supra & accompanying text.
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having no relationship with the employees in the local Anne Arundel
Chapter.
Not only were supervisors employed by Anne Arundel General
Hospital excluded from the local unit, but those individuals also
held no official administrative position in MNA.49 Because the employer with whom the MNA was certified to bargain had none of its
supervisors over whom it could exert influence within the MNA's
management structure, the court's refusal to enforce the Board's
order to bargain apparently rests on a general conflict of interest
theory 0 The Fourth Circuit assumed that the supervisors who were
MNA officials, whether or not employed by Anne Arundel General,
usually would align themselves with management and would exercise their prerogatives in favor of the employer. 51 Moreover, the
court suggested that the MNA had available certain indirect, intraorganizational devices, the most important of which was financial
control, that enabled the state association to control directly the
2
local employer unit.
Although the Fourth Circuit purportedly invoked the NLRB's
prior decisions in Annapolis Emergency Hospital,5' the Board did
not base its opinion in those earlier cases on a broad conflict of
interest theory. Instead, as previously demonstrated, it focused on
the immediate relationship between the parties to the collective
bargaining process; the particular employer, his supervisors, and his
employees." The language of the NLRA provides support for the
Board's restricted inquiry. In its definition of the term "supervisor",
the statute does not include every supervisor but instead refers specifically to an individual who "in the interest of the employer" could
affect the employment status of the "other employees". 5 A necessary element in this definition is the establishment of an employment relationship between the particular employer, supervisors,
and other employees in question. The Fourth Circuit failed to discuss the NLRA's definition of a supervisor; rather, it relied on the
Board's delegation requirement to infer that the Board considered
49. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 534.
50. See note 47 supra & accompanying text.
51. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 535-36. See also Brief for Respondent at 28, NLRB v.
Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977).
52. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 538.
53. Id. at 535-36.
54. See notes 3-21 supra & accompanying text.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970). For the text of § 152, see note 34 supra.
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the MNA to be subject to employer control." The court based this
inference on the NLRB's willingness, as manifested in its previous
decisions, to entertain motions to revoke certifications if the required delegation of bargaining power to the local units did not
occur.57 The Board's acceptance of subsequent review, however,
drew no explicit conclusion that the MNA itself had not qualified
as a bona fide labor organization. Moreover, the stated policies of
the Board do not support this inference; on the contrary, they indicate that, absent proof that the particular employer's supervisors
participated in the organization's management, the NLRB will not
deny certification to the entity on the ground that it is employerdominated. Under this standard the MNA was a qualified labor
organization because no supervisors of the Anne Arundel General
Hospital were in the MNA hierarchy.
Although general influence by supervisors in the MNA is not
grounds for a per se disqualification," the general conflict of interest
problem noted by the court in Annapolis Emergency Hospital is
significant. The Board's conditional certification of the MNA may
be regarded as a procedure designed to minimize this potential
problem rather than as one adopted to circumvent the MNA's improper status.
Delegation of Collective Bargaining
The Fourth-Circuit disagreed with the Board's conditional certification of the MNA as a collective bargaining unit asserting that
such a procedure was "illogical and illegal."59 The court based this
conclusion on its perception that the NLRB had certified the MNA
but had required the delegation of all the MNA's collective bargaining powers and functions to the local unit because the MNA was an
inappropriate representative." According to the court, the Board in
effect had certified a bargaining representative that was not a qualified labor organization under the NLRA, 1 and then had conditioned
that certification by requiring that the MNA refrain from acting as
a bargaining representative. 2 The court held this condition insuffi56.
57.
58.
59.

Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 534-35.
Id.; see notes 29-31 supra & accompanying text.
See note 17 supra & accompanying text.
Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 537.

60. Id. at 535.
61. For the statutory definition of "labor organization", see note 38 supra.
62. Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 536-37.
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cient to validate a certification that initially violated the terms of
the NLRA5
Although the court's technical analysis in this respect is logical
conceptually, it rejects an important, functional procedure developed by the NLRB for implementing the NLRA's legislative purpose. 4 This procedure, conditional certification, provides the Board
with the flexibility it requires to promote the essential purpose of
the NLRA: the encouragement of the collective bargaining process.,
It permits the NLRB to regulate the internal conduct of a labor
organization and thereby to ensure the organization's proper representation of the employees who selected it. Furthermore, the procedure also provides the Board with an alternative to decertification
to protect a labor organization from employer domination.
Although not authorized specifically by the NLRA, the use of
conditional certification should be within the Board's broad discretion in performing its statutory responsibility of designating the
appropriate labor organizations for collective bargaining purposes."
In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 7 the Supreme Court
recognized that the Board could exercise authority not expressly
included in the NLRA, stating that the NLRB "has discretion to
place appropriate limitations on the choice of bargaining represent63. Id. at 536-38.
64. For discussions of the purposes and the legislative history of the NLRA, see, e.g., A.
Cox, LAW AND THE NATIONAL LABOR POuCv 12-13 (1960); S. Mum.an, LABOR LAW AND
LEGISLATION 337-41 (2d ed. 1949); B. SCHWARTZ & R. KoRTZ, STATUTORY HISTORY OF THE
UNrrw STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION (1970); Wollett, Collective Bargaining, Public Policy,
and the National Labor Relations Act of 1947, 23 WASH. L. REv. 205 (1948); Origins of a
National Labor Policy, 61 CoRNELL L. REv. 339 (1976); Comment, Collective Bargaining
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 17 N.C. L. REv. 173 (1939).
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970), which provides in pertinent part:
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes
of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate
and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise
by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms
and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
The Fourth Circuit has articulated the NLRA's purpose as the promotion of "industrial
peace and stability, through collective bargaining." NLRB v. Harry T. Campbell Sons' Corp.,
407 F.2d 969, 975 (4th Cir. 1969). See also Teamsters Local 24 v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 295
(1959).
66. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 331 U.S. 416, 422-23 (1947). See also 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(b) (1970), which provides: 'The Board shall decide in each case whether. . . the unit
appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit ..
67. 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
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atives should it find that public or statutory policies so dictate. 0' 8
In addition to the Court's recognition of the Board's broad discretion, great deference traditionally has been granted employees in
their choice of bargaining representatives." By conditionally certifying the MNA, therefore, the Board not only had respected the employees' preference for a particular bargaining agent but also had
ensured that the labor organization could comply with the statutory
requirements.
The Board may have broad discretion in certifying labor organizations, but this discretion must be exercised from a passive position.
The Fourth Circuit apparently failed to recognize this requirement
when considering the NLRB's conditional certification. In
Annapolis Emergency Hospital, as in St. Rose, Sisters of Charity,
and Sierra Vista, the NLRB was presented with an organization
that unilaterally had decided to delegate its collective bargaining
responsibilities to a local chapter that excluded supervisors."
Rather than restructuring the organization as a condition to its
certification, the Board certified a group that, as constituted, appropriately could represent the employees as their collective bargaining
agent. Although the MNA potentially may have been subject to
employer interference because its membership included supervisors,
its local chapter, which excluded supervisors from membership,
qualified unassailably as a labor organization. The possibly questionable status of its parent-organization should have been an insufficient reason to deny the local unit collective bargaining rights.
Certification only of the local chapter may have been the most
logical approach in Annapolis Emergency Hospital;" this option,
however, was not proffered to the NLRB. The employees chose the
MNA, and under the NLRA, the Board could not impose on the
employees its judgment concerning the selection of an appropriate
bargaining agent. 2 By requiring that the MNA not restructure itself
68. Id. at 422.
69. See, e.g., Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), modified, 190 F.2d 576
(7th Cir. 1951) (in post-election certification proceeding Board may determine only whether

labor organization is appropriate).
70. Dissenting Opinion, 561 F.2d at 529; Sierra Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. at 1087,
93 L.R.R.M. at 1173; Sisters of Charity of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. at 800-01, 93 L.R.R.M.
at 1156-57; St. Rose de Lima Hosp., Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. at 1512, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1183.
71. The court apparently would have approved the Board's certification of the local chapter. See Majority Opinion, 561 F.2d at 535, 536-37.
72. In Morand Bros. Beverage Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 409 (1950), modified, 190 F.2d 576 (7th
Cir. 1951), the Board determined that § 159(a) of the NLRA did not mean "the only appro-
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subsequent to its designation as the exclusive bargaining representative, however, the NLRB's conditional certification both approved
the representative organization as it had been selected by the employees and provided that a competent local unit would bargain
collectively with the employer-hospital.
Employer's Refusal to Bargain
Although purporting to benefit the employees by protecting their
organization from employer influence, the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Annapolis Emergency Hospital actually benefited only the employer. Anne Arundel General Hospital has not necessarily avoided
the duty to bargain collectively with its nurses; nevertheless, it has
been able to delay the process. The court failed to detemine whether
an employer could claim, as a basis for refusing to bargain, that a
labor organization dominated by the employer's supervisors lacked
the capacity to bargain. The Hospital's achievement of this goal,
however, suggests that the court would approve such a claim.
Two factors militate against judicial authorization of a defense for
an employer's refusal to bargain based on his ability to influence the
labor organization. First, Congress statutorily removed supervisors
from the group of employees who are protected from employer discipline when engaging in union activities. 3 A supervisor participating
in union activities, therefore, acts at his own risk, and his employer
lawfully may dismiss him for his unauthorized conduct.7" If an employer objects to his supervisors' participation in a labor organization's activities, he should be required to exercise his right either
to discharge or otherwise to penalize those supervisors; he should
not be permitted to avoid his collective bargaining responsibilities,
priate unit, or the ultimate unit, or the most appropriate unit; the Act requires only that the
unit be 'appropriate.'" 91 N.L.R.B. at 418 (footnote omitted). Section 159(a) provides in
pertinent part:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining

by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment . ...
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970). See also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), which permits employees to select

the bargaining representatives "of their own choosing." For the pertinent text of § 157, see
note 40 supra.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1970).
74. See, e.g., Florida Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 417 U.S. 790, 808-13 (1974); Beasley v.
Food Fair, Inc., 416 U.S. 653, 656-62 (1974).
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however, by protesting against the presence of his supervisors in the
employees' bargaining unit.
Second, a company's assertion as a defense for refusing to bargain
that a labor organization is employer-dominated is inconsistent
with the stated purpose of the NLRA. The employer's invocation of
such a defense is designed neither to promote collective bargaining
nor to protect the rights of workers who attempt to organize.7 Rather, the company's intent, either to delay collective bargaining
or to prevent it altogether by causing the labor organization's decertification, is manifestly irreconcilable with the NLRA's goals.
The anomaly of permitting an employer to invoke his ability to
influence a labor organization as grounds for its decertification has
not been discussed by the NLRB. 8 If the company actually could
dominate the labor group in a manner unrecognized during the
certification process, however, it logically would attempt to preserve
this power and to use it to obtain favorable results during the collective bargaining process. Consequently, whenever the employer asserts the existence of this power while attempting to avoid collective
bargaining, the Board and the reviewing court should recognize that
he probably cannot exercise improper control over the organization
he is challenging.
CONCLUSION

In Annapolis Emergency Hospital,the Fourth Circuit's expansion
of the NLRB's rule denying certification as the exclusive bargaining
representative to employer-controlled labor organizations is incongruous with established Board policies and with the legislative intent of the National Labor Relations Act. The court inappropriately
shifted the focus of its inquiry from whether a particular employer
could exercise control over the organization through its supervisors
to whether any employer's supervisors could influence the labor
group. Furthermore, in its adoption of a strict construction of the
NLRA's definition of "labor organization", the court invalidated a
procedure, conditional certification, that could remove any taint
created by supervisor influence in a parent organization on the local
75. See note 65 supra.

76. See NLRB v. Annapolis Emergency Hosp. Ass'n, 561 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1977); Sierra
Vista Hosp., Inc., 225 N.L.R.B. 1086, 93 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1976); Sisters of Charity of Providence, 225 N.L.R.B. 799, 93 L.R.R.M. 1155 (1976); St. Rose de Lima Hosp., Inc., 223
N.L.R.B. 1511, 92 L.R.R.M. 1181 (1976).
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labor group actually conducting the collective bargaining process.
The court neither analyzed sufficiently the nature of this procedure, which enables the NLRB to ensure the competency of the
labor organization selected by the employees, nor recognized that
such conditional certification is within the Board's discretion in
fulfilling its statutory obligations. This inadequate analysis in
Annapolis Emergency Hospital formed the basis for a decision
that should not be adopted in the other circuits.

